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## 1. SOVIET-POLISH AGREEMENT

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The Soviet-Polish agreement signed in Warsaw on 17 December, although providing for the retention of Soviet troops in Poland, is otherwise highly favorable to the Poles and appears in all major respects to carry out the promises the Soviet leaders made to Gomulka at the time of his trip to Moscow a month ago. In essence the agreement grants Warsaw the right to exercise its sovereignty in respect to Soviet forces stationed in Poland.

Conclusion at this time of an agreement so clearly recognizing Polish sovereign prerogatives suggests that the USSR acted in the interest of bolstering the prestige of Gomulka's regime and of strengthening its ability to cope with sporadic anti-Soviet outbreaks.

The Soviet delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Shepilov and including Defense Minister Zhukov and several Foreign Ministry officials, resembles the type that would normally be sent to negotiate with a foreign power other than a Soviet Satellite. This will serve to enhance Gomulka's stature, particularly within the party, while the agreement itself undoubtedly will be regarded by many Poles as demonstrating Gomulka's ability to deal effectively with the Soviet leaders.

Shepilov's comment following the signing of the agreement that it "opens a new phase in the relations between Socialist countries" suggests that the Soviet leaders may be prepared to discuss the question of the position of Soviet troops stationed in the other Warsaw pact countries as outlined in their declaration of 30 October.

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2. NASR SEES SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL "OUT OF THE QUESTION"

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Nasr is inclined to believe that settlement with Israel is now out of the question, according to Ambassador Hare in Cairo. In a three-hour discussion on 16 December, Nasr indicated he considers the present alternatives in Egypt's relations with Israel to be either continuing tension or peace without settlement. While Nasr said he would be prepared to co-operate to achieve such a de facto peace, he believes that an attempt now to try for settlement with Israel would only make things worse. Nasr gave the impression that on this question he found it difficult to see the road ahead clearly.

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Nasr commented that he did not see how the problem of Israel could be settled prior to a settlement among the Arabs themselves. As long as the Egyptian-Iraqi tension continued, he intimated, Egypt could not take the lead for fear that Iraq would exploit any concessions Cairo might offer Israel to align the other Arab states against Egypt.

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### 3. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR STATES POSITION ON SINAI

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Israeli ambassador to the United States Eban told United Nations secretary general Hammarskjold on 12 December that Israel seeks an eventual permanent demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula.


Eban said that "history and geography had designed the Sinai Peninsula in such a way it could serve as an effective barrier between the two countries." Israel for the immediate present, he said, sought a condition of "nonbelligerency," brought about by a wide separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces.

Eban, who stated that the problem of Sharm al-Shaik and the Gulf of Aqaba could be left for later discussion, told Hammarskjold that Israel would take further steps to implement its policy of phased withdrawal from Sinai in co-ordination with the arrival of the UN forces. He said that if everything went smoothly, UNEF positions should extend over nearly the whole of the peninsula by the end of December or early January.

The Israeli ambassador said occupation by UN forces should not be accompanied by simultaneous occupation by Egyptian forces, as this would merely restore the situation from which "the explosion" arose. He said Israeli policy is to reduce the likelihood of Sinai being militarized as a base against Israel, and that the UN forces should function so as to prevent acts of belligerency in Sinai, in the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal. UN troops should stay long enough to permit, if not a complete Israeli-Egyptian settlement, at least "local settlements" which would establish a position of "nonbelligerency and nonconflict" when the UN troops withdrew.

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#### 4. INCREASED EAST GERMAN CONTROL OVER OFFICIAL ALLIED TRAVEL INDICATED



The Soviet Union appears to have decided to grant the East German authorities almost complete control over Western Allied travelers entering East Germany. This constitutes another effort to gain at least de facto recognition of the East German regime by the Allies as well as another means of harassment of the Allies' vulnerable outpost in West Berlin.



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A Soviet vice consul in Berlin on 14 December told an American official that visas for Western Allied travelers through East Germany were now more difficult to obtain because of delays in getting clearance from the East Germans. He also said that since 5 December Soviet personnel, "including Ambassador Pushkin," are required to get East German documentation for travel in East Germany.

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The Soviet Union apparently is taking the position that it has no authority over travelers in East Germany except those persons connected with the Allied garrisons in Berlin. Soviet authorities, in their recent intensified control of Allied rail and road traffic between Berlin and West Germany, have attempted to define very strictly those persons they consider to be connected with the garrison. Probably attempts will be made to force all other official Allied travelers, such as diplomatic personnel not actually stationed in Berlin, to apply to the East German authorities for visas.

The Russian deputy commandant in Berlin stated on 15 December that "Americans traveling through Schoenefeld Airport will have documents checked by East German authorities since all Soviet control officials have been withdrawn." This will primarily affect diplomatic personnel going to and from Moscow and Warsaw, who normally use this field a few miles outside East Berlin.

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## 5. ATHENS' REJECTION OF BRITISH CONSTITUTION FOR CYPRUS

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The Greek government's rejection of the latest British constitutional proposals for Cyprus will further strain Athens' relations with Britain and Turkey and will almost certainly lead to bitterness in the debate on Cyprus in the UN General Assembly.

The recent visit of British colonial secretary Lennox-Boyd to Athens was probably designed partly to provide evidence for Britain's charges of Greek extremism. According to the American embassy in London, Britain did not expect Greece to accept the constitution, did not intend to permit any changes in the proposals, and planned to permit Greece to consult the exiled Cypriot archbishop Makarios only if Athens were prepared to accept the constitution.

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The Greek reaction ensures that the UN debate expected in early February will be acrimonious. Both sides will probably be forced to take more rigid positions, making a compromise virtually impossible and prolonging indefinitely the tension among Greece, Britain and Turkey.

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